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THE IMPACT OF INDIRECT CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE SIGNALS ON 
FIRM VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM AN EVENT STUDY 
 
 
Abstract 
Prior research shows that signals sent by institutionalized third parties (i.e., indirect 
signals) about firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) can impact firm value. However, the 
effects that different types of indirect CSP signals have on firm value have remained largely 
unexplored. Furthermore, managers often do not fully understand how to communicate CSP 
effectively. In this article, we operationalize CSP as a multidimensional construct and draw on 
signaling theory to examine how different types of indirect CSP signals impact firm value. The 
results of an event study show that institutionalized third parties can play an important role in 
delivering credible CSP-related information to the market. Results also demonstrate that the 
valence (positivity vs. negativity) and content (the specific social domain) of indirect CSP 
signals are important predictors of the magnitude of market reactions, and that shareholders’ 
responses to the valence and content of indirect CSP signals have substantially changed over 
time.  
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; event study analysis; firm value; Domini 400 social 
index social; signaling theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the years, corporate social performance (CSP) has become a central component of 
many firms’ strategies. This commitment to CSP is often—at least partially—driven by the belief 
that “virtuous” firms are financially rewarded in the marketplace. Ample empirical evidence 
supports this belief (Callan and Thomas 2009; Ducassy 2013; Marti et al. 2015; Michelon et al. 
2013; Wahba 2008). For instance, prior studies have shown that communicating social 
responsibility (SR) or irresponsibility (SI) can boost or lower firm value, respectively (Godfrey 
et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2014; Lawal et al. 2017; Miralles-Quiros et al. 2017). 
While extent research provides detailed insights into the effects of direct CSP signals (i.e., 
CSP signals sent directly by firms), knowledge about the effects of indirect CSP signals (i.e., 
signals from third parties, such as CSR rating agencies and CSR-related stock indices, which 
endorse and repudiate firms’ CSP) is incomplete. Prior studies have examined the reliability of 
indirect CSP signals (Chatterji et al. 2009; Delmas and Blass 2010; Delmas et al. 2013) and how 
firms might respond to such signals (Chatterji and Toffel 2010; Scalet and Kelly 2010). 
However, the effects of different types of CSP signals on firm value are still not well understood, 
and managers often lack insights about how to communicate SR and SI to the stock market 
(Fowler and Hope 2007a; Zerbini in press; Ziek 2009). 
Against this background, this article explores how the stock market responds to different 
types of indirect CSP signals. Specifically, we use signaling theory (for a discussion, see 
Connelly et al. 2011; Zerbini in press) as an overarching framework and the event study 
methodology to shed light on whether and how shareholders respond to the valence and content 
of indirect CSP signals. We define signal valence as the extent to which a signal carries positive 
(vs. negative) information about a firm’s level of CSP, and signal content as the specific social 
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domain a signal relates to (e.g., the environment, diversity initiatives). We also investigate 
whether and how shareholders’ responses to the valence and content of indirect CSP signals have 
evolved over time. We use a sample of 195 membership announcements made by a SR stock 
index (the Domini 400 Social Index; hereafter: DSI 400) as indirect signals of CSP. 
Our investigation contributes to the CSP literature in several ways. We show that, by 
reducing the amount of information asymmetry between firms and the market, institutionalized 
third parties can enable rewards and punishments from SR and SI actions, respectively. We also 
build on and add to previous research (Becchetti et al. 2012; Cheung 2011; Consolandi et al. 
2009; Groening and Kanuri in press) by theorizing and demonstrating that the valence and 
content of indirect CSP signals provide essential information to the market and thus, can 
considerably impact firm value. We argue that the valence of indirect CSP signals reduces 
information asymmetries about the quality of a firm’s overall CSP strategy, whereas the content 
of indirect CSP signals reduces information asymmetries about the level of a firm’s CSP in a 
specific domain. We also demonstrate which types of indirect CSP signals affect firm value the 
most and least, and show that the market does not respond to certain indirect CSP signals. Hence, 
our study provides new insights about indirect CSP signals by examining CSP as a 
multidimensional (vs. aggregate) construct. Furthermore, we demonstrate that market responses 
to CSP signals of different valence and content have substantially changed over time. Stated 
differently, we show that time is a key predictor of market reactions to indirect CSP signals. This 
is an important contribution because “notions of time have been virtually absent in CSR 
research” (Wang and Bansal 2012, p. 1136). 
These findings have also substantive managerial implications. They suggest that managers 
should pay attention to the way they communicate CSP to the market, underscoring the 
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importance of third parties in this process. Additionally, our findings should advance managers’ 
understanding of stock market reactions to signals of both SR and SI and thus improve their 
ability to design effective and impactful CSP communication strategies. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first review and build on the 
related literature to develop our hypotheses. We then present our data, methodology, and 
empirical results. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of our 
findings, as well as directions for future research. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
CSP and Firm Value 
Traditionally, the effects of CSP on firm performance have been explained using the 
resource-based view, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory (Dal Maso et al. 2017; Doh and 
Tashman 2014; Fowler and Hope 2007b; Walker and Mercado 2015). Simply put, CSP-related 
theories that draw on the resource-based view (for a discussion, see Branco and Rodrigues 2006) 
argue that SR is a valuable and non-substitutable resources that can, in and of itself, lead to a 
competitive advantage, or lead to the acquisition and development of tangible and intangible 
assets that ultimately determine a firm’s competitive advantage. CSP-related theories that draw 
on stakeholder theory (for a discussion, see Steurer 2006) suggests that firms can enjoy higher 
financial performance from successfully satisfying stakeholders’ needs for SR. CSP-related 
theories that draw on institutional theory (for a discussion, see Delmas and Toffel 2004) suggests 
that conforming to the institutional forces that pressure firms to behave in a SR manner often 
result in accrued legitimacy, and thus higher financial performance. 
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According to these views, a positive change in CSP should thus be associated with higher 
financial performance. Conversely, a negative change in CSP should lead to lower financial 
performance. If, however, shareholders cannot adequately assess changes in a firm’s CSP and 
thus financial performance, they are unlikely to revise their expectations of future cash flows, 
and firm value is unlikely to change. Therefore, a prerequisite to the impact of CSP on firm value 
might be for shareholders to be able to assess precisely whether a firm behaves globally in a SR 
or SI manner, and whether a firm achieves a high or low level of performance in social domains 
they deem important. 
Yet, shareholders might often find it exceedingly difficult to perform such assessments 
accurately for several reasons. First, shareholders are often unaware of the SR activities (or lack 
of) undertaken by a firm (Barnett 2014; Madsen and Rodgers 2015). Second, their assessments 
might be influenced by various cognitive and perceptual biases (for a discussion, see Baker and 
Nofsinger 2002; Hirshleifer 2001). For example, shareholders might tend to ignore or discount 
any CSP-related information about a firm when this information conflicts with their existing 
beliefs about the firm’s level of CSP (confirmation bias). Similarly, the halo (horns) effect might 
cause shareholders who like (dislike) one outstanding characteristic of a firm, such as its CEO or 
level of R&D spending, to judge the firm’s level of CSP more favorably (or negatively) than it 
really is. Complicating further shareholders’ assessment of firms’ CSP, firms tend to behave 
simultaneously in SR and SI manners (Lin-Hi and Müller 2013; Strike et al. 2006) and to not 
fully disclose CSP-related information (Cho and Patten 2007; Kothari et al. 2009). Thus, 
information asymmetries often impedes shareholders’ ability to evaluate a firm’s level of CSP 
correctly (Luo et al. 2015).  
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Signaling CSP 
Given the existence of information asymmetries about the level of a firm’s CSP, signaling 
theory provides a useful framework to explore the influence of CSP on firm performance (for a 
discussion, see Connelly et al. 2011; Zerbini in press), and has thus often been used in the CSR 
literature (Corazza et al. 2017; Huber and Hirsch 2017; Jones et al. 2017). This theory is 
concerned with understanding how two parties resolve information asymmetries about what one 
party (e.g., shareholders) knows about the characteristics and behavior of the other party (e.g., a 
firm), and proposes that information asymmetries can be resolved by parties conveying 
information that is not easily observable (e.g., CSP) through observable and meaningful signals 
(e.g., press release, ISO certifications). 
Signals can either be direct or indirect. Direct signals are “those that a party claiming to 
provide a given quality sends,” while indirect signals are those that “a third party endorsing a 
party claiming to have a given quality sends” (Zerbini in press, p. 3). Direct CSP signals might 
not be as effective at reducing information asymmetries as indirect CSR signals because 
shareholders might not perceive a firm as an especially trustworthy signaler of its own level of 
CSP. Instead, the market might consider CSP signals sent by institutionalized and independent 
third parties (e.g., CSR rating agencies and CSR-related stock indices), to be more credible; even 
though these signals might sometimes not adequately depict a firm’s level of CSP, and different 
third parties have different methodologies to evaluate CSP (Chatterji et al. 2009; Delmas and 
Blass 2010; Delmas et al. 2013). 
Attesting to the potential usefulness of indirect CSP signals for shareholders, the number of 
institutionalized third parties rating and ranking firms has grown rapidly in recent years (Scalet 
and Kelly 2010). As such, prior studies have started to explore the influence of these ratings on 
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firms. For instance, prior research shows that firms respond to poor CSP ratings and rankings by 
third parties by subsequently seeking to improve their CSP (Chatterji and Toffel 2010). Prior 
work also demonstrate that firms tend not to publicly acknowledge poor CSP ratings and 
ranking, instead focusing on discussing positive aspects of their CSP (Scalet and Kelly 2010). 
In this study, we contribute to the aforementioned literature by first examining whether 
indirect CSP signals (i.e., those sent by a third party) can provide credible and relevant 
information that aids shareholders’ evaluations of a firm’s CSP, and by examining how different 
types of indirect CSP signals impact firm value. We propose that the valence and content of 
indirect CSP signals are important predictors of market reactions because these signal 
characteristics communicate information about the quality of a firm’s overall CSP strategy and 
about the level of CSP in specific domains, respectively. Next, we examine whether and how the 
responses of the market to different types of indirect CSP signals have changed over time. We 
propose that shareholders’ responses to the valence and content of indirect CSP signals have 
substantially changed over time. 
Valence of Indirect CSP Signals 
As discussed previously, shareholders might find it challenging to assess precisely whether 
a firm behaves globally in a SR or SI manner. Therefore, we expect that the announcement of a 
firm’s addition to a SR index (i.e., an institutionalized and independent third party) should lead 
shareholders to anticipate that a firm will benefit from higher CSP. In turn, this should lead 
shareholders to revise their expectations of future cash flows upward, positively impacting firm 
value. For the same reason, we also expect that the announcement of a firm’s deletion from a SR 
index will lower firm value. More formally, we propose that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Positive indirect CSP signals cause positive changes in firm value. 
Conversely, negative indirect CSP signals cause negative changes in firm value. 
 
Adding to existing research (Becchetti et al. 2012; Cheung 2011; Consolandi et al. 2009), 
we further expect that a signal of deteriorating CSP (i.e., deletion) has a stronger effect on firm 
value than a signal of ameliorating CSP (i.e., addition). We base this prediction on three 
arguments. First, firms that experience reputation-damaging events usually receive more public 
scrutiny than those experiencing reputation-building events (Rhee and Valdez 2009). Therefore, 
indirect signals of SI could produce relatively greater changes in legitimacy and reputation than 
indirect signals of SR. Second, because firms are more likely to disclose positive than negative 
information (Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Kothari et al. 2009; Scalet and Kelly 2010), indirect 
signals of deteriorating CSP might come as fully unanticipated, leading thus to larger changes in 
expected future cash flows than signals of ameliorating CSP. Third, negative information might 
influence shareholders’ judgments considerably more than positive information (Baumeister et 
al. 2001; Epstein and Schneider 2008). For example, a negativity bias might often cause 
shareholders to give more attention to negative information and find such information more 
relevant and persuasive (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Similarly, prospect theory argues that 
negative information is discounted less, given more weight in judgements, and perceived as more 
diagnostic than positive information (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Thus, shareholders might 
be considerably more influenced by signals of deteriorating CSP than signals of ameliorating 
CSP. More formally, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Negative indirect CSP signals cause larger changes in firm value than 
positive indirect CSP signals. 
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Content of Indirect CSP Signals 
Shareholders might not expect the same changes in future cash flows from different types 
of SR and SI actions. However, the understanding of the effects of CSP on firm value is limited 
because only a small number of studies have recognized the multidimensionality of CSP. For 
instance, past studies have broken down CSP into narrow—but still admittedly aggregated—
components, including activities related to people versus product (Johnson and Greening 1999) 
or institutional versus technical activities (Godfrey et al. 2009). Recently, studies have started to 
examine CSP using more narrowly defined social domains (Awaysheh and Klassen 2010; Jones 
et al. 2014; Kumar et al. 2016; Michelon et al. 2013). For instance, Lawal et al. (2017) examined 
the impact of employee-related and community-related SR on firms’ financial performance, and 
Tebini et al. (2016) explored the impact of environmental-related SR practices. 
Building on these studies, we propose that the content of indirect CSP signals might help 
reduce information asymmetries about the level of a firm’s CSP in a specific domain. We also 
propose that the magnitude of stock market reactions varies according to the content of indirect 
CSP signals; that is, according to the specific social domain endorsed or repudiated by a third 
party. More specifically, satisfying the needs and expectations of primary stakeholders is 
typically more instrumental to financial performance than satisfying the needs and expectations 
of secondary stakeholders (Clarkson 1995; Jones 1995). Furthermore, SR endeavors targeted at 
primary stakeholders tend to have more positive effects on the financial performance of firms 
that endeavors targeted at secondary stakeholders (Kumar et al. 2016). Therefore, shareholders 
should anticipate larger improvements in future cash flows from the signaling of ameliorating 
CSP in domains that relate more closely to the needs and expectations of primary, rather than 
secondary, stakeholders. Similarly, they should anticipate greater deteriorations in future cash 
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flows from deteriorating CSP in domains that relate more closely to primary stakeholders’ needs 
and expectations.  
Given their importance to future cash flows, addressing the concerns of two primary 
stakeholders, namely employees and customers, is of the utmost importance for a firm’s 
continual financial success and therefore, for shareholders. We expect that signaling changes in a 
firm’s ability to develop strong employee relations through employee welfare, safety, benefits, 
involvement, or job security (i.e., employee-related CSP), and to deliver higher value to B2B or 
B2C customers through higher product quality, safety, or innovation (i.e., product-related CSP), 
should generate stronger market reactions than signaling changes related to other CSP 
dimensions. For example, activities such as charitable giving (i.e., community-related CSP) and 
limiting top management compensations (i.e., corporate governance-related CSP) are less likely 
to be perceived by shareholders as instrumental to firm performance and thus, likely to generate 
weaker market reactions. More formally, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Positive and negative indirect signals related to the employee and 
product dimensions of CSP cause larger changes in firm value than indirect signals 
related to other dimensions. 
 
Indirect CSP Signals over Time 
Despite the importance of time in the research and practice of strategic management 
(Ancona et al. 2001), only a handful of CSP studies have incorporated notions of time in their 
theoretical frameworks and empirical models (for notable exceptions, see Bansal 2005; Flammer 
2013; Galbreath 2017). For example, Slawinski and Bansal (2012) and Wang and Bansal (2012) 
examined the effects of firms’ strategic temporal orientations (linear vs. cyclical and short vs. 
long-term orientation, respectively) on CSP strategies and financial performance. Thus, the 
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understanding of whether and how the effect of CSP signals on firm value has evolved over time 
is still incomplete. We seek to fill this gap in the literature. 
Over the years, CSP has received growing attention from various stakeholders, and firms 
have faced increasing external pressure to behave in a SR manner. For example, consumers have 
become more likely to demand SR products; the media has exposed firms’ behaviors to the 
public with increased frequency, and numerous public policies and regulations have been 
adopted to promote SR firm behaviors (Albareda et al. 2007; Steurer et al. 2012). Thus, over 
time, shareholders might have become increasingly more likely to anticipate higher and lower 
future cash flows from SR and SI actions, respectively. Therefore, we propose that shareholders’ 
reactions to indirect signals of SR and SI have become increasingly more positive and more 
negative, respectively. More formally, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Over time, positive and negative indirect CSP signals have had a 
more positive and negative impact on firm value, respectively. 
 
Over time, changes in public attention, strategic priorities, financial performance, and 
regulations can alter the priority that stakeholders give to certain specific social domains 
(Campbell 2007; Kagan et al. 2003). However, to best of our knowledge, research has not 
examined the effects of signals related to different dimensions of CSP over time. Building on the 
aforementioned studies that have incorporated notions of time in their theoretical propositions, 
we propose that the magnitude of market reactions to indirect CSP signals related to different 
dimensions of corporate social reputation should vary over time. In particular, concerns about 
employee relations were mounting and attracting significant attention from stakeholders and 
shareholders in the late 1990’s (Drucker 2002; Hitt and Ireland 2002). Simultaneously, 
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modifications in the composition of the workforce resulted in the expanding idea among 
shareholders that a more diverse workforce (e.g., diverse backgrounds) and better diversity 
management practices were associated with higher financial performance (Cox and Blake 1991; 
Thomas 1990). Therefore, we expect that the effect on firm value of indirect CSP signals related 
to the diversity-related and employee-related dimensions of CSP should be of lower magnitude 
in the early 1990’s and of higher magnitude in the 2000’s (our sample covers the years 1990 to 
2004). More formally, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Over time, positive and negative indirect signals related to the 
employee and diversity dimensions of CSP have had a more positive and negative 
impact on firm value, respectively. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
We successively used two complementary methodologies to test our hypotheses. We 
first used the event study methodology to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
generated by indirect CSP signals and test H1. We then used OLS regressions with CAR as 
the dependent variable to test H2 through H5. 
KLD Database and DSI 400 index 
The KLD database is the most widely used CSP dataset in the management literature. It 
provides firm-level binary ratings on the presence and absence of strengths and weaknesses for 
particular indicators related to seven CSP dimensions: employee relations, community, product, 
corporate governance, diversity, environment, and human rights. It also notes firms’ involvement 
in controversial industries (i.e., alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, tobacco, and nuclear 
power). 
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The DSI 400 is a SR stock index that was launched in 1990 by KLD (now MSCI). It 
consists of 400 constituents selected from large, mid, and small market capitalization firms 
covered in the KLD database. These 400 constituents are selected because they are CSR 
exemplars within their industries and compared to firms of similar sizes. We use membership 
announcements of additions and deletions to the DSI 400 as indirect signals of CSP because the 
KLD is an institutionalized third party that endorses and repudiates firms’ CSP. When KLD 
announces that a firm will be added or dropped from the index, shareholders get credible 
information that helps them evaluate the quality of a firm’s overall CSP strategy and CSP in 
specific domains more accurately. Therefore, these announcements might cause significant 
changes to firm value. 
The Event Study Methodology 
Abnormal returns 
We tested H1 by quantifying the effect of addition and deletion announcements by the DSI 
400 on firm value using the event study methodology. This methodology is frequently employed 
in the CSR literature (Cheung 2011; Lee et al. 2015; Lo and Kwan in press; Yadav et al. 2016). 
The use of this methodology was motivated by our desire to measure the net market-based value 
of indirect CSP signals. We calculated the abnormal returns caused by the announcements of 
addition and deletion from the DSI 400 as the difference between observed and expected returns. 
First, observed returns were computed as indicated in equation (1). 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit                                                                        (1) 
 
where Rit is the observed rate of return of a stock i on day t, αi is the intercept for stock i, βi 
is the systematic risk of stock i, Rmt is the rate of return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio on 
day t and εit is the error term for stock i on day t. The parameters Ŝ
2εi (the variance of εit), β̂i and 
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α̂i are estimated using OLS regression over 200 trading days (t -210 to t -10 days relative to the 
event day t = 0). Once these parameters were estimated, the abnormal return of a stock i on day t 
(ARit) was estimated as indicated in equation (2). 
ARit = Rit – α̂i – β̂i Rmt                                                      (2) 
 
Finally, the CAR were obtained by summing the abnormal returns over a two-day event 
window that encompasses the day prior to the announcement (day -1) and the day of the 
announcement (day 0). The (-1, 0) window is often preferred in event studies (Flammer 2013; 
Godfrey et al. 2009; Groening and Kanuri in press) because the use of longer windows makes it 
difficult to isolate the effect of the event of interest from that of other unrelated events. 
Sample 
We identified 213 announcements of additions and deletions made by the DSI 400 from its 
inception in 1990 to 2004. None of these announcements are based on extraordinary events such 
as bankruptcy, acquisition, or mergers. We then needed to control for confounding events. To do 
so, we used Factivia to search the Financial Times, New York Times, and The Wall Street 
Journal for events that occurred in a six-day window around the day of the announcement (-3, 
+3) and could have affected firm value considerably. Eighteen confounding events (e.g., 
announcements of exceptional dividends, or share buy-backs) were found, resulting in final 
sample of 154 addition and 41 deletion announcements. Other event studies have identified and 
used a comparable number of announcements of addition and deletion from the DSI 400 
(Becchetti et al. 2012; Ramchander et al. 2012). 
Regression Analyses 
Dependent variable 
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We used OLS regressions with CAR in the (-1, 0) event window as the dependent 
variable to test H2 through H5. The method we used to compute the CAR is explained in 
the previous subsection. 
Independent variables 
We created a binary variable named addition dummy. This variable was coded 1 if a firm 
was added to the DSI 400 and 0 if it was deleted. We also created a linear time trend variable 
named time. This variable was generated by assigning an integer number between 0 and 14 to a 
firm depending on the year it was added or deleted from the DSI 400 (i.e., 1990 = 0, 1991 = 1, 
… 2004 = 14). Furthermore, we created eight binary variables by coding the reasons behind each 
addition and deletion. More specifically, we coded whether a firm was added or deleted for one 
of the seven aforementioned CSP dimensions covered in the KLD dataset or for its involvement 
in a controversial industry. For instance, the variable named employee-related CSP is a binary 
variable that is coded 1 if a firm was added or deleted from the DSI 400 for its performance on 
the employee relations CSP dimension and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, the variable named product-
related CSP is a binary variable that was coded 1 if a firm was added or deleted from the DSI 
400 for its performance on the product CSP dimension, and 0 if otherwise. Finally, because firms 
can be added or deleted based on performance related to more than one domain, we also created 
a binary variable named multiple CSP motives. This variable was coded 1 if an addition or 
deletion was made based on considerations related to more than one reason, and 0 if otherwise. 
Control variables 
In all of our regression analyses, we controlled for factors that could systematically affect 
stock market performance. All of our control variables were obtained from the Compustat 
database. We controlled for R&D intensity, advertising intensity, market-to-book ratio, ROA, 
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and firm age at the event date (firm age was log transformed). These controls are used in prior 
related research (Harjoto and Jo 2011; Ramchander et al. 2012; Saeidi et al. 2015). Table 1 
provides summary statistics for all of the variables described in this section. Table 2 provides 
pairwise correlations. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Valence of Indirect CSP Signals 
The first objective of this study was to examine whether shareholders respond to positive 
and negative indirect CSP signals. The second was to examine whether negative indirect CSP 
signals cause larger changes in firm value than positive indirect CSP signals. Supporting H1, the 
CAR caused by addition announcements were positive (0.85 percent; p ≤ 0.01; Table 3, Panel 
B), whereas those caused by deletion announcements were negative (-1.60 percent; p ≤ 0.01; 
Table 3, Panel A). In order to quantify the change in firm value associated with addition 
announcements, we multiplied the market capitalization of each added firm by the CAR 
associated with addition announcements. On average, each addition announcement led to an 
increase of $92.33 million in firm value. The same calculations were conducted for deletion 
announcements. On average, each deletion announcement led to the loss of $133.79 million in 
firm value. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
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The CAR reported in Table 3 provide support for H2. Specifically, as predicted, the 
negative CAR caused by deletion announcements (-1.60%) were of higher absolute magnitude 
than the positive CAR caused by addition announcements (0.85%). We regressed CAR on our 
addition dummy and control variables to examine whether this difference was statistically 
significant and still existed after controlling for factors that could systematically affect stock 
market performance (Table 4, Model 2). The results of this analysis showed that the positive 
effect of addition announcements on CAR was different from the negative effect of deletion 
announcements (B = 0.31; p ≤ 0.001), indicating that negative indirect CSP signals have a 
stronger effect on firm value than positive indirect CSP signals. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Content of Indirect CSP Signals 
The third objective of this study was to examine whether indirect signals related to the 
employee and product dimensions of CSP cause larger changes in firm value than indirect 
signals related to other dimensions. To test H3, we regressed CAR on our multiple CSP motives 
variable, our eight binary variables (e.g., product-related CSP, employee-related CSP) 
representing the seven social dimensions and firms’ involvement in controversial industries, and 
our control variables. The same analysis was repeated selecting only firms that were deleted 
from the DSI 400. Results of these two regression analyses are presented in Table 5 (Panels A 
and B, Models 2). 
We found support for H3. Specifically, addition announcements related to the employee (B 
= 0.21; p ≤ 0.05) and product dimensions (B = 0.20; p ≤ 0.05) of CSP were associated with 
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higher CAR than addition announcements based on performance in other social domains. 
However, shareholders’ reactions to deletion announcements did not vary significantly as a 
function of the specific CSP dimension repudiated. Importantly, the results presented in Table 5 
(Models 2) do not indicate that announcements related to other CSP dimensions have no effect 
on firm value. Instead, these results show that announcements related to CSP dimensions other 
than the employee and product dimensions have effects that are neither statistically stronger nor 
statistically weaker than the average effect of all the other announcements. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Indirect CSP Signals over Time 
The fourth objective of this study was to examine whether the effect of positive and 
negative indirect CSP signals have had a larger effect over time. To test H4, we regressed CAR 
on our addition dummy variable, our time variable, their interaction, and our control variables. 
Results are presented in Table 4 (Model 4) and Figure 1. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Supporting H4, we found a significant addition dummy × time interaction (B = 0.39; p ≤ 
0.05). We examined the conditional effects of time for addition and deletion announcements. 
These conditional effects indicated that the positive effect engendered by addition 
announcements became more positive over time (t = 1.85; p ≤ 0.10), whereas the negative effect 
on CAR engendered by deletion announcements became more negative (t = -1.68; p ≤ 0.10). 
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Furthermore, we examined the conditional effects of additions and deletions over time. These 
conditional effects indicated that the CAR caused by deletion announcements were not 
statistically different from the CAR caused by addition announcements from 1990 to 1993 (all 
p’s > 0.10). However, this difference was statistically significant between 1994 and 2004 (all p’s 
≤ 0.05). 
The last objective of this study was to examine whether positive and negative indirect 
signals related to the employee and diversity dimensions of CSP have had a larger impact on 
firm value over time. To test H5, we regressed CAR on our time variable, our eight binary 
variables (e.g., product-related CSP, employee-related CSP) representing the seven social 
dimensions and firms’ involvement in controversial industries, their interactions, and our control 
variables. Again, as in prior research, addition and deletion announcements were analyzed 
separately. The results of these two regression analyses are presented in Table 5 (Panels A and B, 
Models 3). Supporting H5, we found positive and significant employee-related CSP × time (B = 
0.62; p ≤ 0.05) and diversity-related CSP × time (B = 0.66; p ≤ 0.05) interactions for addition 
announcements. These interactions indicate that, over time, addition announcements related to 
the employee and diversity dimensions of CSP have had a more positive impact on firm value 
than addition announcements related to other CSP dimensions. However, such interactions were 
not found to be significant for deletion announcements, indicating that the negative effect of 
deletion announcements has become uniformly more negative across the different CSP 
dimensions over time. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
Although CSP is a key aspect of organizational strategy, the effects of CSP signals on firm 
value are not well understood (Fowler and Hope 2007a; Zerbini in press; Ziek 2009). This 
research helps fill this gap by complementing prior work on CSP signaling (Awaysheh and 
Klassen 2010; Becchetti et al. 2012; Cheung 2011; Consolandi et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2015). 
Using the event study methodology, we showed that shareholders tend to respond to indirect 
CSP signals. Furthermore, we showed that positive and negative indirect CSP signals cause 
positive and negative changes in firm value, respectively. These findings demonstrate that, 
because shareholders value CSP, but often find it exceedingly difficult to assess a firm’s level of 
CSP precisely, signals from institutionalized third parties (e.g., a SR stock index) can play a 
major role in reducing information asymmetries, and thus can enable rewards and punishments 
from SR and SI endeavors, respectively. Hence, our research adds to studies that show that better 
CSP is associated with higher firm performance (Callan and Thomas 2009; Ducassy 2013; Marti 
et al. 2015; Michelon et al. 2013; Wahba 2008). 
Our findings also add to prior work on CSP signaling (Corazza et al. 2017; Huber and 
Hirsch 2017; Jones et al. 2017; Zerbini in press) by shedding light on how the valence and 
content of indirect CSP signals affect the magnitude of shareholders’ responses to CSP-related 
information. We found that negative indirect CSP signals caused larger changes in firm value 
than positive indirect CSP signals. This suggests that shareholders can indeed be affected by a 
negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001; Epstein and Schneider 2008; Rozin and Royzman 2001). 
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We also found that positive indirect signals related to the employee and customer 
dimensions of CSP had stronger effects on firm value than positive indirect signals related to 
other CSP dimensions, and that, over time, indirect signals related to diversity have had a more 
positive impact on firm value. These results are largely in line with recent prior studies that have 
examined the effect of direct CSP signals related to the seven aforementioned CSP dimensions 
on firm performance (Kumar et al. 2016; Lawal et al. 2017; Michelon et al. 2013). Interestingly, 
we found that shareholders’ reactions to negative indirect signals did not vary as a function of the 
specific social domain repudiated by signals from a third party. Adding to a small number of 
studies (Godfrey et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2014; Michelon et al. 2013), these findings demonstrate 
that CSP signals should be conceptualized as multidimensional. They also demonstrate that 
different CSP signals have differing effects on firm value and that shareholders appear to 
consider the content (i.e., the specific social domain) of indirect CSP signals only when the 
signal is positively valenced. In addition, our findings demonstrate that shareholders presume 
that the employee and customer dimensions of CSP are more instrumental to firm performance 
than other dimensions and that SI hurts firm performance considerably more than SR boosts it. 
Our work also shows that the concept of time is critical to understanding CSP signals. We 
add to a handful of studies (Flammer 2013; Galbreath 2017; Slawinski and Bansal 2012; Wang 
and Bansal 2012) by showing that time moderates the effect of the valence and content of 
indirect CSP signals on firm value. Therefore, our findings underscore the need to build theories 
to account for the effects of time in the relationship between CSP and firm performance. They 
also demonstrate that extra care is needed when comparing studies conducted with data from 
different time periods. 
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Managerial Implications 
Our study has relevant implications for practitioners, which add to existing knowledge on 
how practitioners might want to communicate SR and SI (de Vries et al. 2015). Our findings 
demonstrate that managers can expect indirect CSP signals to impact firm value, and thus 
highlight the importance of third parties in designing impactful CSP signaling strategies. 
Specifically, we found that, on average, firm value changes by about two percent when the 
market receives an indirect CSP signal. These results suggest that managers should hire or solicit 
credible third parties (e.g., external auditors, NGOs) to audit CSP and release credible CSP-
related information. 
Furthermore, our findings advance managers’ understanding of shareholders’ reactions to 
CSP signals by showing that shareholders react differently to different types of indirect CSP 
signals. More specifically, our findings show that negative indirect CSP signals have a stronger 
effect on firm value than positive indirect CSP signals. Hence, managers might want to allocate 
more resources to avoiding low levels of performance in specific CSP domains, rather than to 
reaching high levels of performance in specific CSP domains. This is particularly important 
because our analyses indicate that the financial rewards and penalties from signaling SR and SI 
seem to be growing stronger over time. 
Our findings also show that positive indirect signals related to product, employee relations, 
and diversity had more positive effects on firm value than indirect signals related to other CSP 
dimensions. Conversely, negative indirect signals related to the different CSP dimensions all had 
equally negative effects on firm value. Therefore, managers should focus on pursuing and 
signaling social endeavors related to product, employee relations, and diversity, (typically 
referred to as primary stakeholders) while avoiding a low CSP in all other social domains. 
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This study also adds to existing guidelines that should help fund managers with investment 
decisions (Koellner et al. 2005). In line with prior research, our findings demonstrate that fund 
managers might want to favor investing in “virtuous” firms, as such firm can offer higher returns 
(Collison et al. 2008). They might also favor investing in firms that adequately communicate 
CSP, in firms that manage to avoid a low level of CSP in all social domains, and in firms with 
strong social records related to product, employee relations, and diversity. 
Future Research Directions 
Our findings open interesting avenues for future research. As with every event study, our 
findings can only be interpreted in terms of short-term creation or destruction of firm value. 
Future research should examine longer-term effects. Because the contributions and implications 
of this study pertain strictly to abnormal market returns, it would also be interesting to examine 
how indirect CSP signals influence accounting-based performance metrics such as ROA and 
ROS. Future research might also attempt to replicate our findings with a more recent set of 
announcements. For example, future research might seek to investigate shareholders’ reactions to 
signals in different social domains over time using data covering a longer or more recent time 
period. Furthermore, because every SR stock index possesses unique characteristics, caution is 
required when making comparisons between our study and other related event studies. Future 
research might attempt to replicate our findings using different or multiple SR stock indices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study paves the way for a better understanding of the effect of indirect CSP signals on 
firm value. Using the event study methodology, we examined the effects of signals from the DSI 
400 that endorse and repudiate firms’ CSP. Our findings show that indirect CSP signals have an 
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effect on firm value. In addition, they show that the valence (i.e., positivity vs. negativity) and 
content (i.e., the specific social domain) of indirect CSP signals are important predictors of the 
magnitude of market reactions. More specifically, we found that negative indirect CSP signals 
cause larger changes in firm value than positive indirect CSP signals. We also found that positive 
indirect signals related to the employee and product dimensions of CSP cause larger changes in 
firm value than indirect signals related to other dimensions. Finally, our findings show that 
shareholders’ responses to indirect signals have evolved over time. More specifically, we found 
that over time, positive and negative indirect CSP signals have had a more positive and negative 
impact on firm value, respectively. We also found that positive and negative indirect signals 
related to the employee and diversity dimensions of CSP have had a more positive and negative 
impact on firm value, respectively. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Addition Announcements  
Panel B 
Deletion Announcements 
  Mean Median Min Max  
Mean Median Min Max 
XAD intensity 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.19 
 
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 
XRD intensity 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.36 
 
0.03 0.00 0.00 0.21 
M/B ratio 4.66 2.70 0.42 75.24 
 
3.51 1.88 0.08 41.34 
ROA 0.07 0.06 -0.30 0.62 
 
0.04 0.04 -0.47 0.33 
Firm age 19.36 12.61 0.42 53.50  33.21 36.15 8.09 52.98 
 
Notes. Number of additions = 154. Number of deletions = 41. XAD intensity, XRD intensity, M/B ratio, and ROA are ratios. Firm age is reported in years. 
These variables are described in detail in the section titled “Regression Analyses.” 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Dependent Variable 
                
1 CAR (-1, 0) 
                
Independent Variables 
                
2 Addition dummy 0.30 
               
3 Employee-related CSP 0.11 0.21 
              
4 Product-related CSP 0.05 0.08 0.04 
             
5 Community-related CSP 0.03 0.12 0.05 -0.08 
            
6 Diversity-related CSP 0.00 0.08 0.04 -0.14 0.05 
           
7 Human rights-related CSP -0.03 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.04 -0.13 
          
8 Environment-related CSP 0.07 0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 
         
9 Corporate governance-related CSP 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.13 0.10 
        
10 Controversial industries 0.04 -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
       
11 Multiple-CSP 0.08 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.28 0.45 -0.15 0.17 0.32 -0.05 
      
12 Time 0.00 -0.02 0.10 -0.12 0.05 0.12 -0.28 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.03 
     
Control Variables 
                
13 XAD intensity 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.22 -0.18 -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 
    
14 XRD intensity 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.21 -0.21 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.27 
   
15 M/B ratio -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.10 
  
16 ROA 0.16 0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.21 0.06 0.05 0.27 
 
17 Log firm age -0.04 -0.34 -0.16 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.27 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.15 -0.06 
 
Notes. Bolded correlations are significant at p ≤ 0.05. 
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TABLE 3 
CAR (-1, 0) Caused by Announcements by the DSI 400 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. † p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. Number of additions = 154. Number of deletions = 41. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
Interpretation of Key Results. The results of this table indicate that in the (-1, 0) window, deletion announcements tend to cause negative CAR. However, addition 
announcements tend to cause positive CAR. 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Deletion Announcements  
Panel B 
Addition Announcements 
  CAR Day -1   CAR Day 0   CAR (-1, 0) 
 
CAR Day -1   CAR Day 0   CAR (-1, 0) 
Mean abnormal return -0.67% 
 
-0.93% 
 
-1.60% 
  
0.24% 
 
0.62% 
 
0.85% 
 
t-statistic -1.49 
 
-1.66 * -2.23 ** 
 
1.03  
 
2.10 ** 2.80 ** 
Median abnormal return -0.73% 
 
-0.46% 
 
-0.77% 
  
0.11% 
 
0.33% 
 
0.75% 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank Z-statistic -0.16 † -1.58 
 
-2.24 ** 
 
1.08 
 
3.31 *** 3.10 *** 
% abnormal returns positive 37%   37% 
 
32% * 
 
53%   59% ** 60% ** 
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TABLE 4 
OLS Regressions for the Effects of Signal Valence and Signal Valence over Time 
 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
  Beta   Beta   Beta   Beta   
Control Variables 
        
XAD intensity 0.04 
 
0.06 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
XRD intensity -0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
M/B ratio -0.07 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.08 
 
ROA 0.17 * 0.13 † 0.14 † 0.13 † 
Log firm age -0.04 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
Independent Variables 
        
Addition dummy 
  
0.31 *** 0.31 *** 0.04 
 
Time 
    
0.03 
 
-0.23 † 
Addition dummy × time             0.39 * 
Model Summary 
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R
2
 0.03   0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.14 *** 
 
Notes. † p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. Number of additions = 154. Number of deletions = 41. The dependent variable is CAR (-1, 0). 
 
Interpretation of Key Results. The significant addition dummy coefficients in Models 2 and 3 indicate that the positive effect of addition announcements on CAR (-1, 0) is 
significantly different from the negative effect of deletion announcements. As shown in Table 3, the negative CAR caused by deletion announcements (-1.60%) are of higher 
absolute magnitude than the positive CAR caused by addition announcements (0.85%). Hence, the significant addition dummy coefficients in Models 2 and 3 indicate that 
deletion announcements cause statistically larger changes in firm value than addition announcements. The significant addition dummy × time coefficient in Model 4 indicates 
that over time, the effects of addition and deletion announcements on CAR (-1, 0) have become stronger (Figure 1 shows this clearly).
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TABLE 5 
OLS Regressions for the Effects of Signal Type and Signal Type over Time 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Deletion Announcements 
 
Addition Announcements 
 
Model 
1 
  
Model 
2 
  
Model 
·3 
  
 
Model 
1 
  
Model 
2 
  
Model 
·3 
  
    Beta   Beta   Beta   
 
Beta   Beta   Beta   
Control Variables 
             XAD intensity 0.15 
 
0.12 
 
-0.04 
  
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 XRD intensity -0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.11 
  
-0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 M/B ratio 0.10 
 
0.07 
 
-0.07 
  
-0.11 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.12 
 ROA 0.13 
 
0.09 
 
0.30 
  
0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.13 
 Log firm age -0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
  
0.08 
 
0.09 
 
0.04 
 Independent Variables 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 Employee-related CSP 
  
0.04 
 
2.88 
   
 
0.21 * -0.30 
 Product-related CSP 
  
0.10 
 
2.86 
   
 
0.20 * -0.11 
 Community-related CSP 
  
-0.17 
 
1.80 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 Diversity-related CSP 
  
-0.17 
 
3.37 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
-0.37 
 Human rights-related CSP 
  
0.12 
 
2.56 
 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
-0.06 
 Environment-related CSP 
  
-0.15 
 
1.93 
 
 
 
 
0.16 
 
0.14 
 Corporate governance-related CSP 
  
0.00 
 
-1.20 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
-0.15 
 Controversial industries 
  
0.18 
 
3.26 
 
 
 
 
0.19 * 0.15 
 Multiple CSP motives 
  
0.06 
 
-3.16 
 
 
 
 
-0.19 
 
0.39 
 Time 
  
-0.06 
 
2.24 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
-0.17 
 Employee-related CSP × time 
    
-2.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.62 * 
Product-related CSP × time 
    
-2.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.33 
 Community-related CSP × time 
    
-1.70 
 
 
 
   
0.04 
 Diversity-related CSP × time 
    
-2.92 
 
 
 
   
0.66 * 
Human rights-related CSP × time 
    
-1.28 
 
 
 
   
0.02 
 Environment-related CSP × time 
    
-1.64 
 
 
 
   
0.01 
 Corporate governance-related CSP × time 
   
1.22 
 
 
 
   
0.30 
 Controversial industries × time 
    
-2.06 
 
 
 
   
0.12 
 Multiple CSP motives × time  
    
2.60 
  
  
   
-0.74 * 
Model Summary             
 
            
R
2
 0.07   0.21   0.37   
 
0.03   0.10   0.16   
 
Notes. † p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001. Number of additions = 154. Number of deletions = 41. The 
dependent variable is CAR (-1, 0). 
 
Interpretation of Key Results. The results of Panel B, Model 2 show that addition announcements related to the 
employee and product dimensions of CSP cause larger changes in CAR than announcements related to other CSP 
dimensions. Addition announcements related to other CSP dimensions have effects that are neither statistically stronger 
nor statistically weaker than the average effect of all the other types of announcements. The results of Panel B, Model 3 
show that the effects of addition announcements related to the employee and diversity dimensions of CSP have become 
more positive over time. The results of Panel A, Model 2 show that none of the seven types of deletion announcements 
have a stronger or weaker effect on CAR. The results of Panel A, Model 3 show that the effects of deletion 
announcements on CAR have not significantly changed over time. 
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution over Time of the Predicted CAR (-1, 0) Surrounding Addition and Deletion 
Announcements to the DSI 400 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The predicted CAR (-1, 0) are estimated using the sample mean of our control variable and 
plotted at the mean of time (Mean of time = 7.59; or July 1997) and at +/- 2, 1.5, 1, and 0.5 standard 
deviation (SD) from the mean of time.  
 
Statistical Tests and Interpretation of Key Results. The conditional effects of the addition dummy 
indicate that the difference between the CAR for addition and deletion announcements is insignificant 
between July 1991 and July 1993 (all p’s > .10). However, this difference is constantly significant at, 
and after, July 1994 (all p’s ≤ .05). The conditional effects of time indicate that the negative effect on 
CAR engendered by deletion announcements becomes more negative over time (t = -1.68; p ≤ 0.10), 
whereas the positive effect engendered by addition announcements becomes more positive over time 
(t = 1.85; p ≤ 0.10).  
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